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In this survey, we critically review the argument for central bank independence (CBI). 
We argue CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary stability. First, 
CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several. 
Second, CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable, but instead attention should 
be devoted to the question of why central banks are made independent. CBI is chosen by 
countries under specific circumstances, which are related to their legal, political, and 
economic systems. Third, in a number of empirical studies, researchers found CBI is 
correlated with low inflation rates. By taking the endogeneity of CBI into account, 
however, there is no reason to believe the correlation between CBI and low inflation tells 
us anything about causality. 
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I. Introduction 
Central bank independence (CBI) has become one of the central concepts in monetary 
theory and policy. Most economists agree CBI is desirable because it helps to reach the 
long-term goal of price stability. Although one might think about alternative mechanisms 
to reach low rates of inflation, CBI is clearly the one most often recommended. The idea 
has also found confirmation in the fact that more and more countries in the OECD and 
beyond have made their central banks independent. The culmination of this trend is the 
newly created European Central Bank (ECB) that, according to its statutes, is the most 
independent central bank of all.  
In this survey we wish to critically review the argument for CBI. Compared to other 
surveys (most recently, Berger et al. 2000), which confirm conventional wisdom, we take 
a different view by arguing CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary 
stability. Concerning the claim that CBI is not a necessary condition to achieve price 
stability, we point out CBI is just one monetary policy design instrument among several 
which can be employed for achieving this objective. Our conclusion is that no one 
monetary policy design instrument is optimal under all conditions. We argue CBI is not a 
sufficient condition for price stability, and it should not be treated as an exogenous 
variable. In particular, we think too little attention is devoted to the question of why 
central banks are actually made independent. Consequently, it would be wrong to regard 
CBI as a cause for low inflation rates. 
We begin our discussion by reviewing the theoretical foundations of central bank 
independence. First, we briefly summarize the fundamental models underlying the case 
for CBI. Then we demonstrate there are serious theoretical problems with the standard 
argument that CBI is the optimal choice of a monetary policy design instrument. 
Although these problems are stated in the literature, the typical conclusion is that CBI 
seems to work in practice and it should be seen as the best workable way to achieve low 
rates of inflation (see Berger et al. 2000). We do not find this inference convincing, and it 
certainly does not follow from any empirical tests of the CBI hypothesis.  
Second, we proceed by showing there are alternative monetary policy design instruments 
available which can be employed to achieve low inflation rates. In particular, we focus on 
fixed exchange rate and currency board arrangements, inflation targets, and inflation   2
contracts. It is important to note these approaches have equally or more favorable 
theoretical properties than CBI and, moreover, have been successfully implemented in 
practice. At the same time, there is no doubt every one of these approaches also comes 
with at least one disadvantage, which leads us to the conclusion there is no design 
instrument available that is optimal under all conditions. Thus, CBI is not a necessary 
condition for achieving monetary stability.  
Third, in a number of empirical studies, researchers found CBI is correlated with low 
inflation rates. A typical policy conclusion based on this finding is that the creation of an 
independent central bank will bring about price stability. We argue this conclusion is not 
warranted for a number of reasons. Our focus is on the issue of endogeneity of CBI. Even 
assuming we measure the right thing and there is strong evidence for a relationship 
between CBI and inflation, there is no reason to expect that this finding will be policy 
robust. In other words, this correlation does not tell us anything about causality. Instead, 
at least two decisions determine the choice of CBI by a society. There needs to be a 
decision on whether price stability should become a major economic policy objective. If 
this decision is being made in the affirmative, then comes the question about the 
appropriate choice of a monetary policy design instrument. So the “true” cause 
underlying the empirical relationship between CBI and low inflation rates is the social 
choice in favor of a stability-oriented monetary system.  
Taking these aspects into account, we lay out existing theories and empirical evidence 
regarding the decision to make price stability an important aim for economic policy. The 
two main explanations rest on either the idea of an ‘inflation culture’ in societies that opt 
for a stable monetary regime or, alternatively, that specific interest groups are able to 
influence the government so that such a monetary policy objective is implemented. Then 
we proceed to show under which conditions societies will choose specifically CBI as the 
monetary policy design instrument. Here we consider three determinants of a country: its 
legal, political and economic systems. Dependent upon the existence of specific 
circumstances in these societal subsystems, countries will either choose CBI or any of the 
other available instruments discussed earlier.  
In the conclusion, we summarize the main argument and put forward some suggestions 
for further research.    3
II. The theoretical case for CBI 
 
1. Theoretical background 
The seminal article for the literature on central bank independence is by Barro and 
Gordon (1983). It builds upon earlier work by Kydland and Prescott (1977), who 
introduced the idea of time-inconsistent behavior. They start with the idea that the 
monetary authority is a social welfare maximizer who has complete control over the rate 
of inflation and whose objectives are defined over employment (or output) and inflation. 
Deviations of employment and inflation from their target values (here taken to be zero) 
enter the loss function quadratic. Nominal wage contracts are fixed over a certain time 
period, which implies that inflation reduces real wages, creating more output and 
employment. This creates an incentive to surprise wage setters by letting the rate of 
inflation rise above the expected rate, which determines nominal wage demands.1 
Rational expectations wage setters foresee this incentive and incorporate the expected 
rate of inflation into their nominal wage demands. Under the assumption that the 
objective function of the monetary authority is publicly known, the expected rate will 
reflect the equality between marginal gains and costs from inflation, and the actual rate of 
inflation will be equal to the expected rate. There is no monetary surprise and no 
employment gain, but a positive rate of inflation.2 Promises not to inflate are not credible 
because the welfare maximizing government has an incentive to renege on this promise 
once wage contracts have been signed. Ex-ante optimality requires zero inflation, but ex-
post positive inflation is welfare maximizing. Hence, as Barro and Gordon pointed out, 
an inflationary bias exists in this setup.  
To avoid positive rates of inflation that carry only costs but no benefits, a mechanism is 
sought to commit the monetary authority to a non-inflationary monetary policy. The 
                                                 
1 Blinder (1998) voices serious doubts concerning the assumption central bankers have an 
incentive to use monetary policy in such a way. 
2 An unexpectedly low rate of inflation would create unemployment and thus not be 
pursued in a one-period model. If the central bank aims to build up a reputation for being 
tough, this might change. If, however, unemployment is persistent, then the incentive to 
build reputation is severely reduced (see Grüner 1996).   4
mechanism suggested by Rogoff (1985) is to appoint someone whose preferences are 
known to diverge from those of the welfare maximizing authority. If someone who puts 
more relative weight on avoiding inflation than unemployment were to set monetary 
policy, the rate of inflation would be lower, since marginal costs and benefits from 
inflation are different for that person. Given that the preferences of this person are 
known, the expected and actual rate of inflation would fall. This simple and intriguing 
solution of appointing a “conservative” central banker, as Rogoff called these 
preferences, could help to reduce the inflation bias.  
However, as he also pointed out, this solution is not costless in a world with stochastic 
shocks, because in such a world there is a stabilizing role for monetary policy. With a 
conservative central banker, however, stabilization policy would be relatively weak. 
Hence, lower average inflation comes at the potential price of higher output variability. 
Another aspect pointed out by Rogoff (1985) is that conservatism is only a second-best 
solution to the inflation bias problem. The first-best would be to eliminate existing 
rigidities in the labor and product markets. Rigidities in labor and product markets must 
be present to generate an inflation bias, since if all factors of production are employed 
there is no incentive to increase production and employment.3 
 
2. Independence, conservatism, and political influence 
The Rogoff solution has become the major justification for CBI. Implicitly in this 
argument is the equalization of independence and conservatism. Rogoff (1985, 1177) 
wrote: “Society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the independent 
central bank who is known to place greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to 
unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function.” CBI does not 
imply conservatism, however, and the two concepts should be carefully separated.  
There are a number of serious problems with setting these two concepts equal which 
undermine the case for CBI. For instance, the negative empirical relationship between 
                                                 
3 As Posen (1998) points out there might be circularity between rigidities and 
conservatism of the central bank. If a central bank is very conservative it might cause 
nominal wage rigidities to increase, making disinflation much more costly than 
otherwise. See Gros and Hefeker (2000) for an example with endogenous degrees of 
rigidities.   5
CBI and inflation typically breaks down in a sample consisting of third-world countries 
(see Cukierman 1992). In the case of transition economies, Hillman (1999) has argued 
that the higher the degree of CBI is, the higher the rate of inflation becomes, thus turning 
the evidence that appears to hold for OECD countries on its head. A striking example is 
the central bank of Belarus, which possessed a high degree of independence. 
Nevertheless, the president of the central bank was jailed and replaced by the finance 
minister as his policy fell in disgrace with the government. Hillman draws the conclusion 
that what is necessary is how CBI is actually applied, which he sees as a question of 
political culture.  
It is also possible to find cases that might question the equality of CBI and low rates of 
inflation even among OECD countries. An interesting example is Japan, where inflation 
rates are low and the central bank is strongly influenced by the Ministry of Finance. 
Regarding the U.S., it is arguably the case that the Fed exhibits a higher degree of factual 
than legal independence. Finally, German economic history provides another example 
where the Reichsbank was deemed independent but nevertheless accommodated the 
policy of the government (Vaubel 1997a).  
Moreover, simply granting independence, different to what is often suggested in the 
literature, will not necessarily yield immediate and prompt credibility.4 Countries that 
have a track record of several years (or decades) of very expansive and loose monetary 
policy will not be able to convince the public of a change in its monetary strategy by 
simply changing the legal status of the central bank. Therefore, a change in the exchange 
rate regime, or the introduction of an existing currency, might be more credible and 
effective in changing the public’s expectation of future monetary policy. This conclusion 
is supported by evidence gathered by Blinder (1999) who surveyed central bankers 
around the world, concluding that monetary history is probably the most important 
ingredient of a credible monetary policy.  
One further argument for having legally independent central banks is to avoid political 
business cycles, generated by governments trying to improve their reelection chances. It 
might be argued the simplest solution of this problem is to delegate monetary policy 
                                                 
4 Forder (2001) puts forward a number of critical points regarding the usefulness of the 
concepts credibility and reputation in the discussion of monetary policy.    6
away from the government. If governments are not able to set monetary policy, neither 
are they able to pursue political business cycles using this instrument. In fact, it seems 
there is no monetary policy-induced political business cycle in OECD countries (see 
Drazen 2000b).  
Vaubel (1997a) points out delegating monetary policy may not work as a solution to the 
political business cycle anyway. He argues independent CB councils could be politically 
‘captured’ by the government to perform a monetary policy that corresponds closely to its 
interests. Governments will make political decisions when appointing central bankers, 
which will then support the respective party’s economic policy. He shows the German 
Bundesbank has in several cases engineered an active monetary policy to help the ruling 
party and in other cases set a tighter monetary policy than necessary to deteriorate the 
chances of the government of reelection. Thus although CBs are formally independent, 
they could be politically influenced via the appointment procedure. Again, legal CBI may 
turn out to be a rather poor instrument to measure monetary policy independence, and 
actual independence depends on the behavior of governments in the appointment 
procedure and the behavior of independent central bankers after they have been 
appointed.  
Berger and Woitek (1997) use time series modeling to investigate the validity of 
Vaubel’s claim in the context of political business cycles. If CB councils were captured 
then they would support economic growth by loosening monetary policy. They neither 
find evidence for such a behavior in the time series data nor in an analysis of the 
Bundesbank minutes (see also Vaubel’s reply 1997b). At least one criticism of the Berger 
and Woitek study is that it presupposes that output or employment is always valued 
higher than low inflation by the population. Empirically, a number of survey results 
indicate that, in certain periods, inflation is seen as more important than unemployment 
(see Fischer and Huizinga 1982, Rose 1998, Hayo 1999b).  
Whatever the evidence in this particular case, the general point is worth to be taken into 
account. Since most central bank boards have terms of office going beyond the 
government’s, nothing rules out that an independent central bank has and pursues a 
political agenda on its own that may or may not coincide with that of any particular party   7
in power. It may try to help the government with an active monetary policy, or it might 
just do the opposite. 
A further point is almost all of the models assume the degree of conservativeness could 
be observed, something that is not the fact in more realistic set-ups. If indeed it is 
assumed maximizing social welfare is the policy problem then it might easily happen that 
a central banker is appointed who does not at all find the optimal trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment for society. Appointing someone who is “too” conservative 
would produce excessive output and employment losses at a rate of inflation that might 
be sub-optimally low.  
This alludes to the complex of central bank accountability, an issue that has received 
some attention (see Briault et al. 1996, Muscatelli 1998), especially in the context of the 
role of the ECB and EMU, often referred to as the “democratic deficit” of the ECB 
(Kenen 1995). If it is not possible to observe a central banker's characteristics, than 
society (or its representative government) should have the means to overrule or correct 
actions taken by the central bank. However, this would not be possible with a truly 
independent central bank. It could also be viewed as a very undemocratic solution and 
raises the question of whether a society would like to put itself into the hands of 
bureaucrats who may or may not have the “right” preferences.5  
Finally, it might also be the case that independence of the central bank and 
conservativeness of the central bank's preferences are not complements, as the discussion 
along the lines of Rogoff suggests, but substitutes. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) 
show that if the actual monetary policy stance is negotiated between the government and 
the central bank (something one might reasonably assume if the central bank is not fully 
independent), any desired outcome can be achieved by making the central bank more 
conservative, and thus lowering the rate of inflation that the central bank prefers or by 
giving it more decision power at a lower degree of conservativeness. In both cases the 
same iso-inflation line can be obtained. This would again caution against setting 
independence and conservativeness equal. 
 
                                                 
5 Moreover, it is possible that the preferences of society change (see Lippi 2000 and 
Lindner 1999).    8
3. Credibility and removal of independence 
Another argument that sheds doubt on the general applicability of independence is the 
question of how credible independence really is. As McCallum (1995) has argued, just 
granting central bank independence does not solve the credibility problem but only shifts 
it to another level. Even if the objective function of the central bank had the “right” 
weights, what ensures that the government does not take away independence if it deems it 
necessary? As long as governments can more or less easily revoke the status of 
independence not much is gained in terms of credibility of monetary policy. 
Again the theoretical argument may be stronger than its practical implications. In most 
cases, independence is granted via some central bank law that could, maybe with simple 
or qualified majority, be revoked and changed. Given that such a process would probably 
take some time, the likelihood of generating a “monetary surprise” is quite small. 
Nevertheless, such considerations have prompted some observers to demand 
constitutional status for CBI. Using Germany as an example, Berger (1997) describes 
how the German chancellor Adenauer threatened to change the central bank law in 1956 
when the Bundesbank would not yield to his monetary preferences. In the end he 
refrained from putting his threat into reality for fear of a public outburst of opinion 
against him.  
Hence, at least part of the credibility of CBI is related to the strength of the government’s 
incentive to revoke independence. The trade-off between removing the inflation bias by 
delegating monetary policy to a conservative central banker and the corresponding loss in 
discretion to perform stabilization policy is at the center of this literature.  
In an early contribution, Lohmann (1992) argues governments may want to be able to 
override independent CBs in case of particularly large negative shocks to the economy. 
This restricts the independence of the conservative CB to situations where shocks are 
relatively small. At the same time, the incentive of the government depends on the costs 
it incurs when overriding the independent CB. However, in equilibrium, the government 
will never actually override, as the CB will react according to the interests of the 
government in situations of large output shocks. In this framework, although CBs are 
independent, they nevertheless take the governments preferences into account. The 
empirical implication of this model is that although two CBs are similar in terms of their   9
statutes they may differ dramatically in practice depending on the costs governments 
incur when overriding CBs. Lohmann assumes the costs to override CB decisions depend 
on political institutions in society, or, alternatively, the policymaker is a heterogeneous 
institution which has to overcome a number of procedural rules to change CB decisions. 6 
Thus CBI as measured by legal indices has to be adjusted for the costs of policymakers to 
override decisions and is therefore endogenous relative to the political and social 
framework.  
Cukierman (1994) puts forward a related argument. He points out there could be 
economic and political variables influencing the degree of legal independence granted to 
central banks. The incumbent party faces a trade-off between flexibility of monetary 
policy, necessary to use according to its interests, and credibility, which results in a lower 
inflation premium on its debt. CBI should be higher when there is greater political 
uncertainty, larger government debt, and a stronger preference for low unemployment.  
Jensen (1997) analyzes a deterministic intertemporal game theoretic framework with 
exogenous costs of replacing the (conservative) central banker that enter the loss function 
of the government. He finds “the more important such costs are, the better are economic 
outcomes in absence of pre-commitment in comparison with the case without 
delegation.” (918-919). At the same time, monetary policy delegation cannot remove the 
dynamic inconsistency as long as those costs are not infinite, the reason being the 
government will always have a remaining incentive to implement surprise inflation after 
the private sector has fixed labor market contracts. Moreover, since the desirable goal for 
society should be to obtain the optimal solution to the dynamic monetary policy game, he 
shows reappointment costs in the case of delegation can make it more difficult to reach 
such a solution.  
On the empirical side, De Haan and van’ t Hag (1995) test, among other things, two 
hypothesis relating to a possible inflationary bias coming from the choice of flexibility of 
monetary policy versus credibility for the incumbent government. They look at the 
relation between CBI as a dependent variable and proxies for the inflationary bias as 
                                                 
6 Giordani and Spagnolo (2001) analyze theoretically how political institutions can affect 
how easy CB laws can be changed. They argue some institutions generate sufficient 
inertia to undermine the force of McCallum’s argument.   10
regressors. Further, they try to find out whether governments that are planning to incur 
higher debt are attempting to increase their credibility to reduce the interest rate premium 
resulting from the Fisher-effect. Using data for 19 countries, they do not find evidence for 
either of the two hypotheses. Cukierman and Webb (1995) reach a similar conclusion. 
Thus it is unclear how much weight these theoretical considerations have for practical 
central banking. 
To summarize, there are a large number of theoretical problems connected with the CBI 
argument, and at least some of those seem to have practical relevance.  
 
 
III. CBI is not a necessary condition for price stability 
 
1. Fixed exchange rates, currency boards, and monetary union 
One may doubt the necessity of central bank independence if one compares this to 
alternative instruments that may help to bring about low and stable rates of inflation. One 
of these alternative instruments, receiving a lot of attention in many transition, emerging 
and developing countries, is the choice of a fixed exchange rate as a monetary policy 
strategy.7  
By delegating monetary policy to a proven inflation fighter, such as the US Federal 
Reserve Bank or the German Bundesbank, countries import the credibility of this 
particular central bank. This is basically the same as appointing a conservative central 
banker in the way Rogoff has suggested. It is also the opposite of having an independent 
central bank. An independent monetary policy is not compatible with a fixed exchange 
rate at full capital mobility (capital flow restrictions would not help much in the longer 
                                                 
7 Of course the use of this instrument is not restricted to the mentioned class of countries. 
The EMS peg of many countries to the deutsche mark has been interpreted as an attempt 
to import the Bundesbank’s monetary credibility (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Giavazzi 
and Giovannini 1989), and the EMU can be seen in the same light too. Grüner and 
Hefeker (1995) discuss critically the merit of this argument.   11
time). Even more importantly, governments, having the exchange rate authority, usually 
make this decision, with or without approval of the central bank.8  
It has to be acknowledged such a monetary strategy is also subject to the arguments made 
above about a sudden change in the monetary regime undermining credibility. There are 
many examples, in Europe and elsewhere, where countries have given up their fixed 
exchange rates overnight, either willingly or because they were forced to do so by 
speculators. It has been even suggested that “simple” pegs are not operative any longer, 
simply because they could be brought down too easily in a world of almost unrestricted 
capital mobility (Eichengreen 1994). Credible exchange based monetary policy must then 
come in the form of a full monetary union or as a currency board. The recent trend 
towards currency boards and full dollarization (or eurozation) demonstrates such an 
arrangement is preferred to an independent central bank by many governments. One 
reason might be the successful lobbying of interest groups, which hope to benefit from a 
fixed exchange rate (Hefeker 1997).  
 
2. Inflation contracts and targets 
While the idea of fixing the exchange rate is quite old, there are new concepts in the 
academic discussion of monetary policy, which can be seen as viable alternatives to CBI. 
One fundamental problem with the Rogoff solution is a consequence of appointing a 
conservative central banker may be higher variability of output and employment, as he 
would stabilize shocks less than a “liberal” central banker. Hence, in this framework, 
monetary credibility comes at a cost.  
                                                 
8 As far as we know, there is not a single central bank in the world that has the exchange 
rate authority. It is always the prerogative of the government to make such international 
arrangements. This has been criticized in the run-up to the EMU (Neumann 1991), but it 
was usually neglected that even the role model of independence, the Bundesbank, does 
not possess this authority. For example, the German monetary unification exchange rate 
of 1:1 was implemented against the opinion of the Bundesbank, leading to the resignation 
of the Bundesbank's president Pöhl. Kenen (1995), and Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) 
have made much of the so-called Emminger letter, in which, according to Emminger 
(1986), the Bundesbank obtained a guarantee from the Adenauer government that no 
exchange rate arrangement would ever be made that jeopardized internal monetary 
stability. That this was a legally binding “contract” is questionable.   12
This need not be the case, as Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) have 
argued. Instead of appointing someone with different preferences than society, one could 
influence the incentives of the monetary policy maker. The inflation bias could be 
corrected by imposing a contract on the central banker that would force him to pay a 
pecuniary penalty if monetary policy is employed to combat unemployment over and 
above its use for stabilization. Then, monetary policy could still fully account for 
economic shocks but the systematic inflation component would disappear.  
Of course, in reality it would be rather difficult to write such a central bank contract, as 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) have pointed out. It would require full information about the 
preferences of the central banker to be able to correct for his marginal incentives to create 
surprise inflation. It would also be difficult to define those shocks, which are within the 
scope of stabilization policy. Hence such a contract might lead to conflicts about what 
degree of monetary expansion is still in accordance with the central bank’s area of 
competence. 
A more practical solution is assigning an inflation target to the central bank. This 
solution, adopted by countries such as the UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Australia, Israel, and Canada, often found in connection with a nominally independent 
central bank, can be understood as the opposite of independence.9 Here the government 
either assigns a target for the inflation rate, say 2 percent, over the short to medium run to 
the central bank, or the government and the central bank “negotiate” such a target. If the 
central bank fails to meet this target it not only has to justify its failure, but in some cases 
it is then foreseen that the central bank president loses his job as a penalty (in New 
Zealand). In this way, one hopes to achieve a low and stable rate of inflation by holding 
the central bank, like in the contract solution, responsible for too high a rate of inflation. 
However, the New Zealand example also indicates there is a large degree of discretion 
involved in the interpretation of a violation of such a contract. The governor of the 
Central Bank of New Zealand was not sacked in spite of having missed the target. 
Abstracting from the actual solutions adopted in some countries, the important point is 
that the monetary credibility problem and the inflation bias can be overcome without 
                                                 
9 For a thorough discussion of countries' experiences, see Bernanke et al. (1999).   13
resorting to CBI. Further, at least theoretically, it might be possible to achieve a better 
trade-off between credibility and the ability to stabilize exogenous shocks (Svensson 
1997) by adopting an inflation target. Thus, in principle, the inflation bias problem can be 
solved without compromising the central bank's ability to stabilize.  
An additional point is the empirical importance of time inconsistency as a source of an 
inflation bias has never been empirically scrutinized, and one may have doubts that it is 
indeed a major concern (McCallum 1995). Recent theoretical work within the context of 
dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic models indicates that time inconsistency 
effects play only a limited role within a wide range of parameter values (Albanesi et al. 
2001). However, within our framework, it does not really matter what the specific 
reasons for inflationary tendencies are, and we do not enter into a detailed discussion of 
this issue.  
So far, we have argued the creation of CBI is not a necessary condition for price stability. 




IV. CBI is not a sufficient condition for price stability 
 
1. Central Bank Independence is an endogenous variable 
A number of studies find CBI and low inflation rates are correlated (early studies are 
Alesina 1988, Cukierman 1992, Grilli et al 1991). In conjunction with the theoretical CBI 
literature, the conclusion drawn from these results is that CBI causes low inflation rates. 
We do not think this inference is valid. Regarding the measurement of CBI, we agree 
with Forder (1996, 1998) who raises a number of methodological concerns (see also 
Mangano 1998). He points out legal and factual CBI may differ and thus measuring legal 
CBI and finding a correlation with inflation rates may not tell us a lot about the influence 
of factual CBI. 
There are also studies indicating the relationship is not totally robust with regard to 
control variables and the choice of countries (Cukierman 1992, Posen 1995, Campillo 
and Miron 1997). We do not believe, however, the question of causality can be solved by   14
these studies, as running a single-equation regression imposes the causality relationship 
from the outset. In our view, there exists a two-stage problem in understanding the 
existence of CBI. In the first stage, societies have to decide on their policy priorities. One 
of the questions is whether price stability should be regarded as an important policy 
objective. In the literature, basically two explanations have been given. The first one 
emphasizes that societies differ with regard to their inflation aversion; they have different 
“inflation cultures”. Consequently, the nature of the inflation culture will, directly or 
indirectly, determine the choice of the monetary policy objective. The second approach 
focuses on the political decision process and looks at the interests of economic actors and 
their ability to influence monetary policy objectives. Here the financial sector is 
attributed with having a specific interest in avoiding high inflation rates.  
If a society has decided to pursue price stability, then, in the second stage, a decision has 
to be made about the monetary policy arrangements that can help to bring about such an 
outcome. One of the alternatives is CBI, but we discussed other approaches in Section I 
that also qualify as potential candidates. Under what conditions are societies going to 
choose CBI? The literature points at the characteristics of the respective legal, political, 
and economic systems of countries. In the rest of this section, we analyze the conditions 
for the choices made in this two-stage framework in more detail. 
 
2. National Inflation Cultures 
The first approach to answer the question of why countries differ in their inflation record 
is related to the idea that societies differ with respect to the importance of pursuing a 
monetary policy directed towards low inflation.10 A simple view, called “preference-
instrument view” in Hayo (1998), argues societies, for whatever reason, have differing 
preferences for inflation rates and this is reflected in the setup of monetary institutions 
and in the conduct of monetary policy. Here causality runs from society’s preferences to 
the establishment of specific monetary institutions, such as central bank laws granting 
independence. The degree of CBI is not responsible for varying inflation records of 
                                                 
10 Attempts to track and measure the existence of inflation culture, as well as to provide a 
definition, are made in Bofinger et al. (1998).   15
countries but instead the existing inflation culture, which again determines, for instance, 
whether independent CBs will be set up.11  
This view is somewhat naïve, though, in the sense it presumes preferences for inflation 
are fixed over time. But it is not obvious why this should be the case. More realistically, 
we would expect the actual performance of the CB influences people’s attitudes towards 
price stability. If an independent CB does not bring about price stability, people’s trust in 
this organization will be undermined and its ability to perform a tough monetary stance 
against conflicting interests may be severely damaged. On the other hand, if people 
believe the CB handles monetary policy competently, they will support it in a power 
struggle against, for instance, the government (see Berger and de Haan 1999 for a case 
study of the Bundesbank and the German government). One might call this the 
“historical-feedback interpretation”.  
A major problem with this approach is the path dependence of such an explanation makes 
it very difficult to test it. Using Eurobarometer survey data on European Union countries, 
Hayo (1998) shows the correlation of a proxy for a country’s inflation aversion is at least 
as high as that of CBI and inflation.12 Moreover, both CBI and inflation aversion proxy 
are positively correlated. This finding supports the idea inflation preferences matter, 
although it does not help very much in discriminating between a preference-instrument 
and historical-feedback view.  
Hayo’s study takes on a macro-level approach and it cannot tell us much about who 
within a society may be particularly interested in obtaining price stability. Van Lelyveld 
(1999a) focuses on a cross-section of countries at one particular point in time (see also 
Prast 1996). He uses Eurobarometer 5 from 1976 to analyze two hypotheses put forward 
in the literature: First, higher income leads to more inflation aversion relative to 
unemployment. Second, having a more left-wing political opinion implies less concern 
for inflation. In his results he finds very small support for the importance of income, 
                                                 
11 It might as well be then a question of political culture whether CBI is taken seriously 
and respected, see Hillman (1999). 
12 In an earlier study by Collins and Giavazzi (1993), attitudes towards inflation and 
unemployment are empirically estimated using consumer expectations derived from 
surveys based on a loss function.   16
while there is more evidence a higher preference for income inequality will lead to less 
inflation aversion. An update of this analysis using a survey from 1997 (Eurobarometer 
48) shows these general results appear to hold, although individual models turn out to be 
rather unstable (van Lelyveld 1999b).  
A somewhat different approach to explain the relative inflation aversion of societies is 
used by de Jong (2000). Here the idea is that nations differ in cultural attributes. Certain 
cultural characteristics, such as the extent to which an unequal distribution of power is 
accepted and the degree of uncertainty avoidance, help to explain why some countries 
experience low inflation and others do not. The theoretical argument is supported by 
country-level empirical data based on cultural constructs derived by Hofstede (1980). It 
appears some effects of cultural values on inflation take on a more direct route, without 
affecting CBI. Within our framework, we would argue this indicates the choice of 
alternative design instruments to achieve low inflation rates by some countries.  
 
3. Political interest groups 
One of the first contributions to take the idea of CBI endogeneity seriously is by Adam 
Posen (1993). In his view, economic policy reflects the struggle of interest groups 
attempting to influence policy in a way they consider favorable. It is inappropriate to 
concentrate only on questions of design of organizations, such as central banks, and to 
ignore the self-interest of political interest groups. In particular, he argues monetary 
policy is affected by the lobbying effort of the financial sector, which is assumed to be 
highly inflation averse.  
Although Posen (1993) does not mention it, there are several reasons why commercial 
banks might fear inflation and thus prefer a conservative monetary policy. As banks 
usually borrow short and lend long, they are particularly vulnerable to changes in the 
spread of interest rates. Inflation is sooner or later leading to attempts of disinflation or 
even deflation. These are usually times where banks come under severe pressures, as the 
higher real interest rates that this brings about confronts them with serious problems to 
recover the credits they have given out. Hence, banks might be fearful of inflation and 
disinflation in its wake.    17
Under these circumstances, introducing CBI may make it easier for the financial sector 
interest groups to lobby for support at the CB itself, without going through the usual 
checks and balances of the political system. Further, since there are flows of staff 
members between the CB and private banks, it is relatively easy for the financial sector to 
make its interests heard by the monetary authorities and vice versa. At the same time, the 
financial sector supports CBI, as it makes it easier to influence monetary policymaking. 
In view of this complementarity of interests, both financial sector and central bankers 
form a coalition supporting each others demands, with the result that inflation will be 
kept low.  
In this framework, it is not really CBI that causes monetary policy to strive for low 
inflation rates. Rather, central bankers simply reflect the interest of a specific group, 
namely the private financial sector, which is ultimately the source of low inflation. The 
stronger is the financial sector in its ability to lobby for low inflation, the more weight 
will be given to price stability by the monetary authority.  
There are a number of problems related to Posen’s approach. First, it is not obvious that 
low inflation rates are always in the interest of the financial sector. For instance, the 
increase in nominal interest rates as a result of higher inflation may mask a larger spread 
applied by banks. Second, the empirical evidence that the financial sector is inherently 
inflation averse is not compelling. Although Posen (1995) presents supportive evidence, 
other studies find less or no support (De Haan and van’t Hag 1995, Campillo and Miron 
1997, Temple 1998). This need not be seen as a deadly a blow to Posen’s theory, though, 
as the construction of the index for financial opposition to inflation involves a number of 
strong assumptions, and thus may not bear much resemblance to the theoretical concept. 
Moreover, in a recent paper Maier et al. (2000) show the Bundesbank’s monetary policy 
was influenced by financial sector pressure. Though they do not make this argument, it 
can be interpreted as supporting Posen’s theory.  
Finally, if it truly were the influence of the financial sector that determines CBI, then we 
should observe fluctuations in inflation rates over time to correspond with financial sector 
lobbying power. Casual evidence does not suggest a close correspondence, but this is an 
issue deserving more attention.    18
Now, taking for given that some countries may care a lot about inflation, what makes 
them choose CBI and not one of the other alternatives? The following two sections 
present the relevant contributions in the literature.  
 
4. Legal system, political system, and factual CBI 
We start off our discussion by returning to McCallum’s (1995) point delegation cannot 
solve a possible dynamic inconsistency problem, all it does is to relocate it to a different 
level. The crucial issue then is the question of why delegation should be more credible 
than leaving monetary policy in the hands of the government anyway? As argued above, 
credibility might be improved if changing delegation decisions is costly. Hence it may be 
useful to look at legislation, jurisdiction and the political system in more detail. Indeed, 
there is theoretical and empirical evidence that certain aspects of institutional 
characteristics correlate with inflation rates.  
Moser (1999) puts forward a model that contains two conditions for delegation to be 
credible. First, there must be two decision-making bodies which share the legislation and 
have veto powers over one another. Second, these two legislative bodies differ with 
regard to their inflation-output preferences. The hypothesis he derives from this set-up is 
that those countries characterized by these conditions will have more independent central 
banks. In the empirical analysis, he distinguishes between three groups of countries: those 
with strong checks and balances in their legislation, those with weak checks and 
balances, and those with no checks and balances. He finds countries with strong checks 
and balances have more independent CBs compared to those with weak or no checks and 
balances. The countries in the last group have the most dependent CBs. In a second step, 
he regresses group dummies for checks and balances plus these dummies interacted with 
CBI on average inflation rates. The outcome of this regression is less straightforward. In 
particular, the shift term of the country group with no checks and balances is smaller than 
that of the other groups. This implies that countries with dependent CBs do not 
necessarily have higher inflation rates. In our framework, this can be interpreted as 
evidence some countries have found other means to achieve low inflation rates. It is 
worth pointing out that the proxy used by Moser to measure the legislative framework is   19
limited in scope, and he might miss distinctive features of the legal framework of some 
countries.  
A related study makes the point that certain characteristics of political systems may help 
us to understand why countries have implemented CBI and other countries did not is 
(Farvaque 2000). Countries which have a bicameral system may not have much need to 
delegate monetary policy and thus feature less independent CBs. This result somewhat 
contradicts Moser’s finding, as Farvaque uses a very similar proxy variable. More federal 
countries also exhibit a higher degree of CBI. An indicator for the proximity of 
politicians to voters (constituencies to km
2 of country) shows the further away politicians 
are the higher CBI is. Finally, a non-robust effect is that the longer governments stay in 
power (average duration to longest duration in percent) the higher CBI is.  
An empirical paper by Bagheri and Habibi (1998) analyzes the relationship between CBI 
and political liberty and instability. They find both political liberty and stability are 
positively linked to CBI, which means countries that allow more political freedom and 
are characterized by less regime and political party instability show higher degrees of 
CBI. It is conjectured that CBI changes while countries move from non-democratic to 
highly democratic political systems. Within our framework, this implies CBI becomes 
directly dependent upon the nature of the political system in a country, and the law of 
motion with respect to political change and CBI is also clearly defined.  
However, the empirical analysis shows a number of weaknesses. For instance, there are 
almost no control variables in the models, while, at the same time, the authors introduce a 
country group dummy for Austria, Germany and Switzerland claiming the ‘… index of 
legal central bank for these three countries was much higher than others and introduction 
of this dummy variable significantly increased the quality of regressions’ (p. 197). This 
sounds very much like data mining and does not enhance trust in the stability of the 
results.  
There is a similar problem with Moser’s results, as he finds no supporting evidence using 
the CBI indicator by Eijfinger and van Keulen (1995). He states this is not surprising as 
this index includes changes in CB law in preparation of entering EMU. His defense is 
‘…independent of their political system, member countries of the European Union are 
forced by the Treaty of the European Community to install independent central banks’ (p.   20
1584, FN 12). This is not a convincing argument because member countries have entered 
into EMU by their free will, so if there were no political commitment (as in the case of 
the UK and Denmark), then they would not have joint. Survey data reveals in each 
member country, except UK, Denmark and Germany, that there was a majority of people 
in favor of entering EMU (Hayo 1999a). This can be interpreted as another indicator that 
checks and balances are only part of the story. In particular, if there exists a consensus in 
society on this issue, it is unlikely the two legislative bodies will differ to an extent that 
has a notable effect on the set-up of the CB. In other words, if there is agreement to 
delegate monetary policy to an institution with a higher degree of independence than any 
national central bank, this can be seen as a sign of political consensus rather than 
disagreement, and Moser’s argument becomes void.  
Finally, Voigt (2000) argues there is an interaction between the independence of the 
jurisdiction and that of the CB. A culture of rule of law may very much strengthen the 
position of an independent CB. If there were an undermining of CB de jure independence 
by the government, people would oppose such behavior, thereby supporting CBI. Thus, a 
culture of rule of law may be a substitute for a stability-oriented inflation culture. 
However, a prerequisite for this argument to work is that CBI already exists, and this 
again raises the question of why it came about in the first place.  
To summarize, the literature has started to isolate specific characteristics of the legal and 
political system that help to explain the introduction of CBI but there remain of number 
of unsolved issues. The next section looks at one specific characteristic of the economic 
system, the organization of the labor market, which may help to explain the creation of 
CBI in certain countries.  
 
5. Labor market institutions 
The Rogoff analysis is based on the US experience with many weak labor unions. Hence, 
labor is considered as being atomistic, and there is no strategic interaction between labor 
and central banks. If labor instead is not atomistic, as is the case in many European 
countries, one should expect that labor unions internalize to a certain degree the negative   21
effects of high wages on employment and inflation. 13 Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have 
argued highly organized labor unions will show as much restraint in their wage demands 
as highly decentralized, and thus competitive, labor unions.  
Using the same idea, labor unions should discipline their wage demands if they too have 
an interest in low rates of inflation. If this is the case, a large union will show wage 
discipline to an extent that reflects their interest in avoiding high inflation. Guzzo and 
Velasco (1999) have pointed out that an ultraliberal central banker will bring low rates of 
inflation because labor unions themselves will discipline their wage demands, thus 
ensuring high employment and making an over-expansive monetary policy no longer 
necessary. This line of reasoning turns the conservativeness argument on its head. 
Of course, this theory has to be qualified if labor unions are not monopolistic, as 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) have shown. Lippi (1998a,b) has further qualified the case 
for the liberal central bank by showing in the intermediate case of several large labor 
unions, the effect of inflation on the relative real wage set by a trade union could produce 
a so-called competition effect. Given the other unions’ nominal wage demands, a 
particular union will demand higher nominal wages, which will lead to a lower level of 
labor demand in the economy from the perspective of the individual union. The 
moderating effect of this mechanism will be larger the more conservative the central bank 
is because in this case a nominal wage translates into a higher real wage, thus disciplining 
any single labor union. 14 
Moreover, Berger et al. (2001) have asked why labor unions should be inflation averse. 
While it makes sense to assume labor unions - like the rest of society - care about 
inflation (Cubitt 1992; al-Nowaihi and Levine 1994) this is nevertheless an ad-hoc 
assumption. They provide a micro-foundation for this inflation aversion of monopolistic 
labor unions by distinguishing between outside options for the labor union 
                                                 
13 If there are many labor unions, or if the central bank is able to commit to its monetary 
policy, the underlying game structure is changed. If instead of the Stackelberg approach a 
Nash approach is chosen, labor unions would not discipline their wage demands and, 
therefore, a conservative central bank would be more adequate (see Jerger 2001). 
14 See also Soskice and Iversen (2000) and Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000). 
Lawler (2000), in addition, shows in a stochastic environment central banks should not be 
ultra-liberal because they would produce high inflation variance.   22
(unemployment benefits) defined in nominal versus real terms. Only if the outside option 
of the union is in nominal terms can the case for a liberal central banker be made. In this 
case, a wage induced price increase will leave non-employed labor union members worse 
off (as their real unemployment benefits are reduced) which moderates the union's wage 
demands.15 In the case of a real outside option, however, the union's wage setting 
behavior and monetary policy are no longer connected. Therefore, a government valuing 
employment and stable prices is better off fixing the level of unemployment benefits and 
social transfers in real terms and appointing a conservative central banker.  
Hence, when taking strategic behavior of labor market participants into account the case 
for the conservative central bank could be once again undermined. Reflecting the 
sensitivity of these theoretical results to changes in the assumptions, the decision to 





In this paper, we have argued that the conventional view CBI is a necessary and/or 
sufficient instrument for achieving low inflation rates is not convincing. We present an 
alternative way of thinking about CBI that is both theoretically and empirically more 
plausible. The idea is that societies have to make two decisions about monetary policy. 
First, they decide on the importance being attached to fighting inflation as an important 
objective. Then the second decision has to be made on what is the best institutional 
arrangement to achieve the objective of price stability, given the existing political, legal, 
and economic framework. The first decision indicates CBI is not a sufficient condition 
for price stability as it is not the ultimate cause but just an instrument among many to 
achieve this objective. The second decision makes clear CBI is not a necessary condition 
for price stability in general, although it may be the right solution for some countries.  
                                                 
15 Berger et al. (2001) assume a monopoly labor union, thus not discussing the case of 
multiple large unions. If, however, the case for the conservative central banker can be 
resurrected for a monopoly union than the argument must be even stronger with multiple 
unions.   23
Using this two-step procedure, we can easily encompass a wide variety of findings on 
monetary policy and CBI in the literature, while this is not possible within the 
conventional framework.  
In the first part of the paper, we use theoretical arguments to ask how strong and 
convincing the case for central bank independence really is. We argue other solutions to 
the time-consistency problem exist, such as inflation targets, fixed exchange rates, and 
inflation contracts, and some may be even preferable to independence and 
conservativeness because they involve lower costs, while at the same time achieving low 
rates of inflation. It is usually impossible to write complete inflation contracts, but 
inflation targets or exchange rate-based monetary policies are practical and frequently 
chosen alternatives to CBI. These alternatives are often combined with “independence” 
of the central bank, but as we have argued, this cannot really be understood as proper 
independence. Hence, CBI is a relevant concept in practice but it is not at all the only 
choice.  
In the second part of the paper, we present the existing literature on CBI endogeneity. In 
particular, we identify two sources determining why societies choose to give fighting 
inflation a high policy priority. First, there are cultural differences, which help to classify 
societies according to inflation aversion. Second, political interest groups may have a 
specific interest in keeping inflation low and if they are strong enough they may be able 
to affect the political outcome in their favor.  
Regarding the choice of CBI versus the other potential instruments, we discuss the 
literature looking at political, legal and economic determinants of this choice. For 
instance, higher costs of changing the legal status of central banks in terms of political 
difficulties may lead to an adoption of CBI. Political freedom may be a condition 
conducive to implementing CBI. So while countries move forward towards greater 
political freedom we would expect CBI is chosen more and more often. If for some 
reason CBI has already been established then a ‘culture of law’ may help to prevent any 
change to the central bank law. Finally, when labor markets are characterized by a strong 
union, appointing a conservative central banker as president of an independent central 
bank may not be the right solution. On the other hand, Rogoff’s (1985) result can be   24
resurrected when labor markets are atomistic or when the outside option for unions is 
defined in real terms.  
Although our framework for analyzing monetary policy arrangements is more refined 
than the usual CBI argument, it is still quite crude. For instance, it does not allow for 
much flexibility in terms of informal arrangements. In an interesting case study of 
France, Italy, and the UK, Cobham et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of informal 
CBI in the conduct of monetary policy. They show changes in average inflation were not 
always accompanied by changes in the degree of CBI and changes in the formal degree 
of CBI did not always lead to the expected changes in inflation rates. Another point noted 
by several authors is public support for the central bank needs to be strong enough to 
make the implementation of (sometimes harsh) monetary policy measures successful 
(Posen 1995, Bofinger et al. 1998, Hayo 1998). Within the scope of this paper, however, 
we cannot do justice to these refinements.  
There are several areas where further research would be necessary. First, we think there is 
more to be learned about the causes for choosing anti-inflationary policy institutions by 
analyzing survey data. In particular, one could combine macro and micro level 
information in a panel data set to address a multitude of interesting questions. Second, the 
empirical evidence for the interest group argument is still ambiguous. In addition, one 
could fruitfully look at other interest groups apart from the financial sector. Even more 
can be learned about why societies choose CBI and not one of the other possible design 
instruments. Here the empirical results are quite weak and much more energy has to be 
spent on constructing appropriate dummy variables that capture relevant characteristics of 
a country’s legal, political and economic framework.   25
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